Liquidity Crises and the Market-Maker of Last Resort

Charles Kahn, David Marshall and Robert L. McDonald

No 33587, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study market illiquidity in an economy subject to non-fundamental shocks. Asset trading occurs via decentralized one-on-one bargaining. The model has multiple rational expectations equilibria; we associate certain Pareto inferior equilibria with liquidity crises. The government can improve welfare by acting as a “market-maker of last resort” (MMLR), purchasing assets at above-market prices. Several policies employed by the US during the financial crisis are examples of MMLR. We consider “aggressive” and “conservative” MMLR policies. The aggressive policy supports the unique pareto optimal equilibrium. The conservative policy, which embeds a “no-bailout constraint,” only supports an inefficient equilibrium.

JEL-codes: E58 G10 G18 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-03
Note: CF ME
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