Interventionist Preferences and the Welfare State: The Case of In-Kind Aid

Sandro Ambuehl, B. Douglas Bernheim, Tony Q. Fan and Zachary Freitas-Groff

No 33688, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why is in-kind aid a prominent feature of welfare systems? We present a lab-in-the-field experiment involving members of the general U.S. population and SNAP recipients. After documenting a widespread desire to limit recipients’ choices, we quantify the relative importance of (i) welfarist motives, (ii) utility or disutility derived from curtailing another’s autonomy, and (iii) absolutist attitudes concerning the appropriate form of aid. Choices primarily reflect the two non-welfarist motives. Because people systematically misperceive recipient preferences, their interventions are more restrictive than they intend. Interventionist preferences and non-welfarist motives are more pronounced among the political right, particularly when recipients are black.

JEL-codes: D31 D78 H19 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-04
Note: PE
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