Martyrs, Morale, and Militarism: The Political Impact of Devastation and Slaughter

Shizuka Inoue, David Weinstein and Atsushi Yamagishi

No 33842, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Opinion is sharply divided about whether the bombing of an enemy's civilian targets and the killing of their combatants results in an adversary's population becoming pacifist or pro-military. Identification is difficult because natural experiments are rare, and effects may be heterogeneous. For example, killing enemy combatants may create martyrs, while targeting civilians may lower their pro-war morale. We solve this problem by leveraging a natural experiment in Japan in which military casualties and urban destruction varied exogenously, but differentially, across cities. We then estimate the impact of devastation and slaughter on support for Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, which aims to revise Japan's constitution to enable it to rearm. We find contrasting effects of targeting soldiers and civilians—military deaths induce future pro-military voting, while urban destruction induces pacifist voting. Moreover, these effects persist long after most people with direct experience of the war have died.

JEL-codes: D7 H56 N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
Note: ITI POL
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