The Political Economy of Stimulus Transfers

Silvia Vannutelli

No 33973, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Stimulus transfers are widely used during economic downturns, yet they are often poorly targeted from an economic perspective. I show that political incentives might help explain this discrepancy. I study one of the largest stimulus tax credits in Italy which excluded the poorest individuals and targeted middle-income earners. Leveraging quasi-random geographic variation in recipient shares and a difference-in-differences design, I find that the transfer raised the incumbent party’s vote share by 0.18 percentage points per 1 pp rise in recipients. These gains persist for at least five years. Political returns are stronger in areas with relatively richer beneficiaries, despite weaker consumption responses, and electoral punishment for exclusion is similarly asymmetric: higher-income excluded individuals reduce support for the incumbent, while poorer excluded individuals do not. Voters also punish incumbents when transfers are revoked, helping explain why temporary programs are rarely repealed. A counterfactual transfer targeting poorer households would have increased the consumption response by 30\% but reduced electoral returns by at least 15\%. These findings highlight a key political-economy trade-off in stimulus design, where electoral incentives skew transfers toward politically responsive recipients, as opposed to consumption responsive recipients. JEL: D72, H23, H53, I38, O15.

JEL-codes: D72 H23 H53 I38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-pol
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