Can Author Manipulation of AI Referees be Welfare Improving?

Joshua Gans

No 34082, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines a new moral hazard in delegated decision-making: authors can embed hidden instructions—known as prompt injections—to bias AI referees in academic peer review, thereby hijacking machine recommendations. Because AI reviews are relatively inexpensive compared to manual assessments, referees would otherwise delegate fully, which undermines quality. The paper shows that moderate detection of manipulation can paradoxically improve welfare. With intermediate detection probabilities, only low-quality authors undertake manipulation, and detection becomes informative about quality, inducing referees to mix between manual and AI reviews. This partially separating equilibrium preserves the value of peer review when AI quality is intermediate. When detection is too low, all bad papers are manipulated and the market unravels; when detection is perfect, referees use only AI and acceptance collapses. Thus, some prompt injection must be tolerated to sustain the market: it disciplines referees and generates information. The results caution against zero-tolerance enforcement and highlight how prompt injection can, counterintuitively, play a welfare-enhancing role when AI reviews are easily produced.

JEL-codes: D82 D86 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-07
Note: PR
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34082.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34082

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34082
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().