Social Defaults and Plan Choice: The Case of Spousal Following

Tal Gross, Timothy Layton, Daniel Prinz () and Julia Yates

No 34137, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how couples in the Medicare Part D program choose an insurance plan. Over 70 percent of enrollees choose the same plan as their spouse. Even among those with differing healthcare needs, well over half do so. Discrete-choice models suggest beneficiaries value being on the same plan as their spouse at over a thousand dollars per year. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we show that younger spouses disproportionately follow their older spouse’s plan choice. Joint plan choice contributes modestly to overall overspending, but increases costs substantially for the couples with different cost-minimizing plans.

JEL-codes: D12 D14 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm and nep-hea
Note: EH
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Working Paper: Social defaults and plan choice: The case of spousal following (2025)
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