Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms

Jonathan Eaton

No 3424, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: I develop a model in which sovereign debtors repay debt in order to maintain a reputation for repayment. Repayment gives creditors reason to think that the debtor will suffer adverse consequences if it defaults, so they continue to lend. I compare a situation in which competitive lenders earn a zero profit on each loan with one in which they can make long-term commitments to individual borrowers, so that the zero-profit condition applies only in the long run. In many circumstances a borrower benefits, ex ante, if lenders commit to denying credit to a borrower in default even if at that point a subsequent loan is profitable. Furthermore, a "debt overhang," while possibly altering credit terms, does not cause profitable investment opportunities to go unexploited.

Date: 1990-08
Note: ITI IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp.25-35 (January 1996).

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