Biased Party Nominations as a Source of Women's Electoral Underperformance

Thomas Fujiwara, Hanno Hilbig and Pia Raffler

No 34396, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: What accounts for differences in electoral success between male and female candidates? We argue that parties systematically nominate female candidates to districts where the party is less popular, making it harder for women to get elected. Our empirical strategy uses the German mixed electoral system to create counterfactual gender vote gaps. These gaps represent the scenario where male and female candidates are nominated in districts where their respective parties have equal popularity. Using data on all candidates for the German Bundestag across eleven elections, we document that female underperformance, and its variation across parties and election years, is explained almost entirely by women running in districts where their party is less popular. In contrast, we find no evidence that voter bias or candidate characteristics play a substantial role. Our argument highlights gendered party gatekeeping that increases in district strength as an important driver of female underrepresentation.

JEL-codes: P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gen and nep-pol
Note: POL
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