Moral Regulation and Cultural Production: Evidence from Hollywood

Ruixue Jia and David Strömberg

No 34539, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Moral regulation is widespread across societies, yet its consequences have seldom been examined empirically. We study the Hays Code (July 1934–1960s), which imposed systematic moral guidelines on American cinema. Using a regression-discontinuity design, with non-U.S. films providing a comparison group, we find that the moral compliance of U.S. films rose sharply after 1935 and remained high for two decades. The Code also reshaped protagonists and political tone: protagonists became less likely to be women or working class, and political tones grew more conservative. Filmmakers adapted both by increasing compliance within genres and by shifting across them: less-compliant Drama declined while more-compliant Western and Action rose. Companies with a larger market size and immigrant film directors exhibited stronger responses. These findings reveal how moral constraint, market, and identity jointly shape cultural production and how well-intentioned moral regulation can generate broad and often unintended spillovers.

JEL-codes: L51 L82 N72 P16 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-12
Note: DAE LE POL
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