Geopolitics in the Evaluation of International Scientific Collaboration

Alexander C. Furnas, Ruixue Jia, Margaret E. Roberts and Dashun Wang

No 34789, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This study provides evidence that geopolitical considerations systematically shape funding evaluations of international collaboration proposals. We examine this dynamic in the consequential context of U.S.–China collaboration. Across two large-scale randomized experiments with U.S. policymakers and U.S.-based scientists, we find substantial and consistent penalties for proposals involving China-based collaborators. Policymakers express much greater unconditional support for proposals with Germany-based collaborators than for otherwise identical proposals with China-based collaborators (68% vs. 28%). Crucially, this penalty is not confined to policymakers: scientists themselves exhibit a sizeable 18 percentage-point gap (48% vs. 30%), despite professional expectations of merit-based evaluation. Much of the difference reflects a shift from unconditional to conditional approval rather than outright rejection. These penalties are remarkably consistent across scientific fields and respondent characteristics, with little evidence of heterogeneity, indicating that they reflect geopolitical rather than domain-specific concerns. Overall, the findings suggest that geopolitics influences gatekeeping judgments in government funding, with broad implications for peer review, scientific norms, and the future of international collaboration in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

JEL-codes: C93 F52 H40 O31 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
Note: PE POL
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