Screen More, Sell Later: Screening and Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market

Manuel Adelino, Bin Wei and Feng Zhao

No 34815, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of asset origination with unobservable screening effort and signaling of loan quality through delayed sale by extending Vanasco (2017). The theory predicts a positive relationship between screening effort and the strength of the signal. We test this central prediction using U.S. mortgage data, measuring screening effort by mortgage processing time. Consistent with the theory, loans that take longer to process are sold with longer delay and are less likely to default, even though observably riskier loans are processed more slowly. Our calibration reveals that the subprime mortgage market operated in a parameter range with endogenous fragility.

JEL-codes: G01 G21 G23 G32 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
Note: AP CF
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Working Paper: Screen More, Sell Later: Screening and Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market (2025)
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