Multidimensional Signaling and the Rise of Cultural Politics

Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

No 34909, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In turbulent times, political labels become increasingly uninformative about politicians’ true policy preferences or their ability to withstand the influence of special interest groups. We offer a model in which politicians use campaign rhetoric to signal their political preferences in multiple dimensions. In equilibrium, the less popular types try to pool with the more popular ones, whereas the more popular types seek to separate themselves. The ability of voters to process information shapes politicians’ campaign rhetoric. If the signals on the cultural dimension are more precise, politicians signal more there, even if the economy is more important to voters. The unpopular type benefits from increased conformity, which bridges the candidates’ rhetoric and makes it more difficult for voters to make an informed decision.

JEL-codes: D72 D84 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02
Note: POL
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