Reason for Treason

Xinyu Fan, G Gary Richardson, Zhihao Xu and Sicheng Zhao

No 35069, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Defections during war are extreme changes in loyalty. What motivates military officers to betray their motherland and serve the invaders? Using a novel dataset of career paths for over 2,800 high-ranking (colonels and generals) Nationalist (KMT) military officers during the Second Sino-Japanese War (as part of World War II), we examine defection cases to Japanese puppet regimes. Three findings emerge. First, high-ranking KMT officers who advanced more slowly in their careers were more likely to defect; suggesting that internal organizational recognition matters. Second, officers who were underpromoted compared to their schoolmates and townsmen were more likely to defect, suggesting that peer comparison matters. Third, officers were more likely to defect when their defected peers had better career prospects in the enemy’s camp, suggesting that external recognition matters.

JEL-codes: D73 D74 M51 M52 N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
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