The Limits of Political Representation: Evidence from India

Veda Narasimhan and Jeffrey Weaver

No 35217, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Political inclusion is widely believed to improve governance, motivating the creation of elected representatives for highly localized constituencies. This paper studies 1.2 million "hyperlocal" representatives across 150,000 local governments in rural India. Exploiting discontinuities that determine the number and identity of these representatives, we assess how expanded representation affects governance outcomes. We find precisely estimated null effects on core functions, including public project management, intermediation in access to benefit programs, alignment of policy with citizen preferences, equity of benefit allocation, and oversight of public finances. These findings highlight the limits of expanding political representation if representative capacity is weak.

JEL-codes: D72 H41 H75 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
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