Incentives, Evidence, and Reminders for Bureaucrats: Overcoming Barriers to Policy Scale Up

Patrick Agte, Daniel R. Morales, Christopher Neilson, Sebastián Otero and Gautam Rao

No 35291, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Scaling up effective policies often requires the attention of frontline bureaucrats with many competing responsibilities. Even when policymakers adopt effective programs, implementation may not follow. In a nationwide experiment in the Dominican Republic, we test interventions to increase school principals' implementation of an educational program proven effective in a previous RCT. Only 37% of control schools verifiably implemented the intervention when ordered to by the Ministry of Education, compared with 83% in the original trial. Implementation was no higher among schools that previously implemented the program in the RCT, suggesting that fixed costs of adoption do not explain non-adoption. We find precise null effects of sharing research evidence, providing modest financial incentives, or offering implementation assistance to principals. In contrast, additional reminder calls increased implementation by 20 percentage points. A second experiment targeting a different mandated program yields the same pattern: reminders produce large effects, while monitoring messages have smaller effects. Our findings point to limited attention among bureaucrats as an important barrier to scaling policies.

JEL-codes: D9 O1 O15 O20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
Note: DEV ED POL
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