How Frontline Supervisors Shape Priorities: Evidence from Police Lieutenants

Matthew Gudgeon, Andrew Jordan and Taeho Kim

No 35306, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how frontline supervisors shape outcomes in public organizations with competing objectives and limited monitoring. We examine lieutenants in the Chicago Police Department, exploiting its rotational operations calendar for identification. We document dispersion in lieutenant fixed effects on team arrests and find race to be a key predictor. We then compare days Black and Hispanic lieutenants are predicted on duty to days supervised by white lieutenants. Teams under Black and Hispanic lieutenants make fewer low-level arrests while improving 911 call dispatch time. Lieutenants shape effort allocation by differentially granting overtime and awards for serious rather than discretionary arrests.

JEL-codes: J15 J45 K42 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
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