Oligopsony and Collective Bargaining

Tirza J. Angerhofer, Allan Collard-Wexler and Matthew Weinberg

No 35476, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Employers facing limited labor market competition may suppress wages below socially optimal levels. Unions can counteract wage suppression through collective bargaining, though they may also push wages above the socially optimal level and lead to job rationing. We estimate a structural model of labor supply, labor demand, and Nash-in-Nash bargaining over wages between local teacher unions and school districts in Pennsylvania’s K-12 public school system from 2013 to 2019. We compare negotiated equilibrium wages and employment to oligopsony wage posting and social planner scenarios. On average, oligopsony reduces wages 7 percent below the social optimum, while collective bargaining raises wages 8 percent above it. Averages mask substantial district-level heterogeneity driven by bargaining power variation. Twenty-eight percent of school districts have salaries lower when public schools are unionized than when they are not due to cross-district externalities, where high salaries at one school cause hiring reductions that increase labor supply elsewhere.

JEL-codes: J31 J42 J45 J51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
Note: IO LS
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