Elite Capture, Meritocracy and Social Stability: Evidence from the Chinese Imperial Examinations

Jingjing Chen, Jianlei Han, Shing-Yi Wang and Yongxiang Wang

No 35531, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines reforms in China’s imperial examination system during the Northern Song dynasty that anonymized exam submissions and ended local officials’ discretion to recommend candidates. Using prefecture-level data from 960–1127 and a difference-in-differences design, we compare areas with and without prominent elite families, where corruption and elite capture were more likely. The reforms increased the share of successful candidates from commoner backgrounds and narrowed their performance gaps with elites in scholarship and political achievement, indicating better selection of commoner talent. Treated prefectures also saw less social unrest. Overall, the reforms strengthened meritocracy, broadened political access, and promoted stability.

JEL-codes: D73 J45 N45 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
Note: DEV LS POL
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