Staged Access and Liability for Dual-Use Artificial Intelligence

Joshua Gans

No 35586, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How should regulators combine staged access to a dual-use AI model with developer liability? I model a defender and an adversary searching for the same software flaws. After release, liability induces more defensive search but also makes the adversary search harder, limiting its effect on harm. Exclusive access removes this strategic response, so staged access and liability are complements in protection. Defensive effort rises towards the release date, making additional delay progressively less productive. Optimal evaluation windows are therefore bounded, and their response to greater harm saturates. Because defensive search uses real resources, the efficient liability rate can be below full internalisation of harm. That rate generally cannot induce the developer to choose the regulator's preferred release date, leaving a distinct role for a timing mandate.

JEL-codes: D74 K13 L51 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08
Note: PR
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