Race and Redistricting in Local Governments

Carlos Fernando Avenancio-León, Daniel Jones and Ying Shi

No 35623, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Electoral maps translate residential geography into political representation, yet they have never been systematically measured for thousands of local governments across the country. We reconstruct 3,712 city council and county commission maps across 18,521 districts using nationwide voter-file and Census data. Enacted maps overrepresent White voters and underrepresent Black and Hispanic voters, with gaps predicting the racial composition of officeholders. We juxtapose these with simulated, race-blind maps satisfying common districting constraints. Simulated maps reproduce much of this disparity, showing that geography skews representation before any boundary-drawing. Enacted maps substantially improve on the race-blind baseline only in jurisdictions subject to oversight from the Voting Rights Act or districting litigation. As courts curtail race-conscious districting, local governments may revert to a baseline that is formally neutral but substantively unequal.

JEL-codes: D72 H70 J15 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08
Note: LE POL
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