Fear as a Campaign Tool: Evidence from the 2014 U.S. Ebola Scare

Filipe Campante, Emilio Depetris-Chauvin and Ruben Durante

No 35660, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the supply of political communication highlighting perceived threats, using the 2014 Ebola scare as a natural experiment. Analyzing Twitter posts and congressional newsletters from US House and Senate candidates, we find Republicans increased Ebola-related communication, emphasizing negative sentiment and links to immigration. This response was strongest in safe Republican seats, consistent with base signaling. The supply side was active, not reactive: the Republican response did not vary with proximity to diagnosed cases despite concentrated voter anxiety, politician tweets predicted public Ebola activity but not vice-versa, and more intensive messaging correlated with better electoral outcomes, controlling for local conditions.

JEL-codes: D72 D91 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-08
Note: POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35660.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35660

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35660
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().