Pensions and Turbulence: Automatic Adjustment, Risk, and Fairness in Long-Term Pension Design

Peter Diamond

No 35693, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Public pension systems are long-term social contracts operating under persistent economic, demographic, and political uncertainty. Periods of turbulence, marked by financial shocks, changes in longevity, and shifting labour markets, test the capacity of pension institutions to adapt while maintaining adequacy, equity, and legitimacy. Building on earlier joint work on pension economics and reform with Nicholas Barr, this chapter analyses the role of automatic and semi-automatic adjustment mechanisms in public pension design. Drawing on comparative experience from Sweden, Canada, and the United States, we examine mechanisms for maintaining financial balance, the incorporation of life expectancy into retirement age and benefit design, and the accumulation and drawdown phases of defined contribution pensions. We argue that well-designed automatic mechanisms can discipline political decision-making and improve resilience, but only if they are proportionate, transparent, and attentive to distributional and intergenerational consequences. In turbulent times, good pension design does not eliminate the need for political choice; rather, it structures that choice so that adjustment can occur without repeated crises.

JEL-codes: H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
Note: PE
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Working Paper: Pensions and Turbulence: Automatic Adjustment, Risk, and Fairness in Long-Term Pension Design (2026)
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