When Tax Shields Shrink: Interest Deductibility Limitations and Corporate Innovation
Xinru Chen,
Mara Faccio,
Stefano Manfredonia and
Jin Xu
No 35775, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We investigate how limiting interest deductibility under the 2017 TCJA shapes corporate innovation. Using alternative identification strategies, we show that, relative to unaffected firms, affected firms experience significant declines in patenting and narrow the technological scope of their patent portfolios. This contraction is concentrated in exploitative patents, the type of innovation most naturally supported by debt financing. By weakening firms’ ability to finance innovation with long-term debt, interest limitations reveal a novel channel linking taxation to innovation, with the debt tax shield serving as an implicit subsidy. Cross-country evidence from the staggered implementation of interest limitation rules confirms negative effects.
JEL-codes: G3 G31 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
Note: CF
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