The Geopolitical Trap: How Great Power Rivalry Protects Rising Powers

Johann Caro-Burnett, Sebastian Galiani and Gustavo Torrens

No 35862, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why do rising powers survive periods in which established states can still suppress them? Existing theories of preventive war emphasize commitment problems between declining and rising states, which can make adverse power shifts especially dangerous. We show that commitment problems among established rivals can have the opposite effect. Preventive action against a rising power can alter the incumbent’s relationship with another state. Under opportunistic rivalry, prevention temporarily exposes the incumbent to exploitation by an existing rival. Under defensive rivalry, successful prevention strengthens the incumbent by eliminating a potential counterweight, giving its rival an incentive to protect the rising state. In both cases, third-party responses can deter preventive action that would occur in an otherwise identical dyadic setting. Cooperation among established powers can reverse this result when credible arrangements allow them to manage the strategic consequences of suppression. Historical evidence from the American Revolution, China’s nuclear emergence, and U.S.–Soviet bargaining over West German nuclear capabilities illustrates the mechanisms and their limits. The analysis shows how rivalry among established powers can protect vulnerable rising states and thereby facilitate changes in the international distribution of power.

JEL-codes: P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
Note: DEV
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