Inside Central Bankers’ Calendars: How Do Fed Chairs Allocate Their Time?

Thomas Drechsel and Dali Tsakadze

No 35913, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How leaders allocate their limited time and attention is an important question in economics. This paper constructs and analyzes a novel data set covering the daily calendars of three Federal Reserve Chairs, Ben Bernanke, Janet Yellen, and Jerome Powell, containing more than 20,000 calendar entries. We document several patterns. First, all Fed Chairs spend more than 30% of their documented meetings with Fed staff, highlighting the crucial role of economists in the Fed's decision process. Second, interactions with the media became more frequent during Bernanke's tenure and remained important until the end of Powell's tenure. Third, Powell held significantly more meetings with lawmakers than both Yellen and Bernanke, reflecting an increasing need for the Fed to engage with political actors. Beyond these trend patterns, we examine the time allocation of Fed Chairs at business cycle frequencies and show how different activities respond to shifts in the macroeconomic environment. Finally, we place our findings in historical context using the available calendars of earlier Fed Chairs, including Alan Greenspan.

JEL-codes: D71 D72 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-his, nep-hpe and nep-sog
Note: ME
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