Externalities from Labor Mobility

Laurence Ball

No 3720, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper assumes that workers can move from a market with high unemployment to one with low unemployment at a cost. In principle. equilibrium mobility can be greater or less than the social optimum. For most plausible parameter values. however. mobility is too low. Intuitively. mobility has a beneficial externality: it helps workers remaining in the high-unemployment market by reducing competition for jobs. Mobility hurts workers in the market that movers join, but this effect is usually smaller.

Date: 1991-05
Note: EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3720.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3720

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3720

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().