The Role of International Organizations in the Bretton Woods System

Kathryn Dominguez

No 3951, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the roles played by organizations in maintaining the Bretton Woods System. Theory indicates that even if countries understand that cooperation will lead them to a Pareto superior outcome, they need not cooperate unless they are convinced that other countries are also committed to doing so. In this context international organizations can facilitate cooperation by serving as commitment mechanisms. Cooperation in the Bretton Woods System involved the maintenance of stable exchange rates and unrestricted trade among member countries. The commitment mechanisms that the Bretton Woods Institutions provided member countries included: rules of cooperation, financial resources to enable them to play by the rules, and a centralized source of information on each others' commitment to the rules. Post-war history suggests that information monitoring and sharing has been a relatively effective commitment mechanism for international organizations.

Date: 1992-01
Note: ITI IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System, edited by Michael Bordo and Barry Eichengreen. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Published as The Role of International Organizations in the Bretton Woods System , Kathryn M.E. Dominguez. in A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform , Bordo and Eichengreen. 1993

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3951.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: The Role of International Organizations in the Bretton Woods System (1993)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3951

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3951

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().