Is Arbitration Addictive? Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field

Janet Currie and Henry S. Farber

No 3952, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We test for the presence of an addictive effect of arbitration (positive state dependence) using data both from a laboratory bargaining experiment and from the field. We find no evidence of state dependence in the experimental data, and we find weak evidence of positive state dependence in the field data on teachers in British Columbia. Hence, we reject the view that use of arbitration per se leads to state dependence either through reducing uncertainty about the arbitral process or through changing the bargaining parties' perceptions about their opponents. The results further suggest that an explanation for any positive state dependence we find in the British Columbia field data must lie in an aspect of the arbitration process which is not captured by our simple experimental design.

Date: 1992-01
Note: LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Industrial Relations Research Association Papers and Proceedins, Jan. 1993

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3952.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Is Arbitration Addictive? Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3952

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w3952

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().