Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages
Louis Kaplow and
Steven Shavell ()
No 4287, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Assessment of damages is a principle issue in litigation and, in light of this, we consider the social justification for, and the private benefits of, accurate measurement of harm. Greater accuracy induces parties to exercise levels of precaution that better reflect the magnitude of the harm they are likely to generate, and related, it stimulates uninformed parties to learn about risks before acting. However, accuracy in the assessment of harm cannot influence the behavior of parties -- and is therefore of no social value -- to the degree that parties lack knowledge of the harm they might cause when deciding on their precautions. In addition, regardless of the social value of accuracy, litigants generally gain by devoting resources toward proof of damages, leading often to socially excessive private incentives to establish damages.
JEL-codes: K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-03
Note: LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)
Published as Journal of Law and Economics, vol. XXXIX, no. 1, pp. 191-210, April 1996.
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4287.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages (1996) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4287
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w4287
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().