A Comparison of the United States and Canadian Banking Systems in the Twentieth Century: Stability vs. Efficiency?
Michael Bordo (),
Hugh Rockoff () and
Angela Redish ()
No 4546, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
This paper asks whether the vaunted comparative stability of the Canadian banking system has been purchased at the cost of creating an oligopoly. We assembled a data set that compares bank failures, lending rates, interest paid on deposits and related variables over the period 1920 to 1980. Our principal findings are that: (1) interest rates paid on deposits were generally higher in Canada; (2) interest income received on securities was generally slightly higher in Canada; (3) interest rates charged on loans were generally quite similar; (4) net rates of return to equity were generally higher in Canada than in the U.S..
JEL-codes: E44 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published as "The U.S. Banking System from a Northern Exposure: Stability vs. Efficiency ." Journal of Economic History, Vol 54 (June 1994): 325-341.
Published as R2085 same as wp title: in Anglo-American Financial Systems: Institutions and Markets in the Twentieth Century, Michael D. Bordo and Richard Sylla, eds., pp. 11-40, (Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin Professional Publishing, 1995).
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