Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry

Robert Hubbard and Darius Palia

No 4704, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.

JEL-codes: G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-04
Note: CF ME
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

Published as Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 39, (1995). pp. 105-130

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Journal Article: Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry (1995)
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