Credit Markets and the Welfare Costs of Inflation

Jose De Gregorio and Federico Sturzenegger

No 4873, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We construct a simple model in which high inflation imposes welfare costs because it affects the ability of the financial sector to screen between high and low cost producers. Consumers search for a low price and inflation reduces the incentives to search, resulting in an increase in the demand of high cost producers. We show that beyond a certain level of inflation there is a switch from a separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium, where financial institutions become unable to distinguish among clients. In this pooling equilibrium a larger share of credit is allocated to less efficient firms.

JEL-codes: E31 E44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-10
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published as "Welfare Costs of Inflation, Seigniorage, and Financial Innovation", IMF, Vol. 38, no. 4 (1991): 675-704.

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