How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops

Nicholas Barberis, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer and Natalia Tsukanova

No 5136, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We use a survey of 452 Russian shops, most of which were privatized between 1992 and 1993, to measure the importance of alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring. Restructuring is measured as capital renovation, change in suppliers, increase in hours that stores stay open, and layoffs. There is strong evidence that the presence of new owners and new managers raises the likelihood of restructuring. In contrast, there is no evidence that equity incentives of old managers promote restructuring. The evidence points to the critical role that new human capital plays in economic transformation.

Date: 1995-05
Note: CF LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Journal of Political Economy, vol.104, no.4, 1996.

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Journal Article: How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (1996)
Working Paper: How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (1996)
Working Paper: How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (1995)
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