Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives

Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison ()

No 5234, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper examines the agency conflict between mutual fund investors and mutual fund companies. Investors would like the fund company to use its judgement to maximize risk-adjusted fund returns. A fund company, however, in its desire to maximize its value as a concern has an incentive to take actions which increase the inflow of investment. We use a semiparametric model to estimate the shape of the flow-performance relationship for a sample of growth and growth and income funds observed over the 1982-1992 period. The shape of the flow-performance relationship creates incentives for fund managers to increase or decrease the riskiness of the fund which are dependent on the fund's year-to-date return. Using a new dataset of mutual fund portfolios which includes equity portfolio holdings for September and December of the same year, we show that mutual funds do alter their portfolio riskiness between September and December in a manner consistent with these risk incentives.

Date: 1995-08
Note: CF IO
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Published as Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, no.6 (1997): 1167-1200.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)
Working Paper: Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1996)
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