Economics and Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on the Uruguay Round
Yujiro Hayami and
Yoshihisa Godo
No 5341, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
This paper reviews the recent problems of the opening of Japan's rice market and evaluates the Japanese government's rice policy from both an economic and political viewpoint. The Japanese government made strenuous resistance to the opening of Japan's rice market during the negotiations on agricultural trade at the GATT Uruguay Round. Eventually Japan's rice was made exempt from tariffication by compensating in the form of increased 'minimum access' import quotas. However, the tariffication rule of the final agreement guarantees that importing countries can impose considerably high tariffs. Thus, the volume of Japan's rice imports could be decreased if the Japanese government accepted the tariffication agreement. In retrospect the decisions made by the Japanese government have effectively protected the vested interests of the domestic rice distribution system, while hindering the structural improvement of the Japanese rice industry.
JEL-codes: F14 Q10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-11
Note: ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
Published as Yujiro Hayami & Yoshihisa Godo, 1997. "Economics and Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on the Uruguay Round," NBER Chapters, in: Regionalism versus Multilateral Trade Arrangements, NBER-EASE Volume 6, pages 371-404 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5341.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Chapter: Economics and Politics of Rice Policy in Japan: A Perspective on the Uruguay Round (1997) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5341
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5341
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().