The Principle and Market Failure in Systems Competition

Hans-Werner Sinn

No 5411, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Contrary to a frequent contention, systems competition cannot work when governments respect the Subsidiarity Principle. The principle implies that governments step in where markets fail. Reintroducing markets through the back door of systems competition will again result in market failure. Three models are presented which illustrate this wisdom. The first is concerned with congestion-prone public goods and shows that fiscal competition may be ruinous for the governments. The second considers the insurance function of redistributive taxation and shows that systems competition may suffer from adverse selection. The third studies the role of quality regulation and shows that systems competition may be a competition of laxity resulting in inefficiently low quality standards.

JEL-codes: H70 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-01
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as C and S Working Paper, November 1995 Journal of Public Economics 66 (1997) 247-274 H Selection

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