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Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?

Dani Rodrik

No 5537, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper demonstrates that there is a robust empirical association between the extent to which an economy is exposed to trade and the size of its government sector. This association holds for a large cross-section of countries, in low- as well as high-income samples, and is robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls. The explanation appears to be that government consumption plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant amount of external risk. When openness is interacted with explicit measures of external risk, such as terms-of-trade uncertainty and product concentration of exports, it is the interaction terms that enter significantly, and the openness term loses its significance (or turns negative). The paper also demonstrates that government consumption is the majority of countries.

JEL-codes: F15 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-04
Note: ITI IFM PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (96)

Published as Journal of Political Economy (October 1998).

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Journal Article: Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? (1998) Downloads
Working Paper: Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? (1996) Downloads
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