Abandoning the Nest Egg? 401(k) Plans and Inadequate Pension Saving

Andrew Samwick and Jonathan Skinner

No 5568, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: There has been rapid growth in `self-directed' pension programs such as the 401(k) plan. Because such plans are voluntary, there is concern that many workers neglecting to contribute will reach retirement with inadequate pension saving. First, we show that people who are eligible for 401(k)s, do not contribute to them, and have no alternative pension plan make up only 2-4 percent of the workforce. By contrast, nearly 50 percent of workers have no pension coverage at all. Imposing mandatory 3 percent or 5 percent contribution rates will improve retirement prospects among the lowest decile of pension- eligible, but would have small aggregate effects. Finally, restricting 401(k) withdrawals when the worker changes jobs could have a larger impact on retirement pension security.

JEL-codes: D31 J32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05
Note: AG PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Public Policy Towards Pensions, Schieber, Sylvester J. and John B. Shoven,eds., Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 197-217.

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