Exclusive Dealing

B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael Whinston

No 5666, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, we provide a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of exclusive dealing, and we explore the motivations for and effects of its use. For a broad class of models, we characterize the outcome of a contracting game in which manufacturers may employ exclusive dealing provisions in their contracts. We then apply this characterization to a sequence of specialized settings. We demonstrate that exclusionary contractual provisions may be irrelevant, anticompetitive, or efficiency-enhancing, depending upon the setting. More specifically, we exhibit the potential for anticompetitive effects in non-coincident markets (that is, markets other than the ones in which exclusive dealing is practiced), and we explore the potential for the enhancement of efficiency in a setting where common representation gives rise to incentive conflicts. In each instance, we describe the manner in which equilibrium outcomes would be altered by a ban on exclusive dealing. We demonstrate that a ban may have surprisingly subtle and unintended effects.

JEL-codes: L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-07
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael D. Whinston. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, 1998, v106(1,Feb), 64-103.

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Working Paper: Exclusive Dealing (1992)
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