International Conflict, Defense Spending and the Size of Countries

Alberto Alesina and Enrico Spolaore

No 5694, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the process of country break-up.

Date: 1996-08
Note: ME
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published as Alesina, Ablerto and Enrico Spolaore. "Conflict, Defense Spending, And The Number Of Nations," European Economic Review, 2006, v50(1,Jan), 91-120.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5694.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5694

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5694

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().