The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand

Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer

No 5856, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Evidence from a survey of 105 shop-owners in Moscow and Warsaw shows that the reliance on private protection, as well as the burden of regulation and corruption, are much greater in Moscow. The evidence suggests that the `invisible hand' model of government better fits the Warsaw local government, and the`grabbing hand' model is more appropriate for Moscow. The evidence implies that the singular focus on the speed of economic reforms to understand the success of transition is misplaced, and that the quality of government may be as essential.

JEL-codes: E (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-12
Note: EFG PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

Published as American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1997.

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Journal Article: The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand (1997)
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