Equilibrium Unemployment

João Gomes (), Jeremy Greenwood and Sergio Rebelo ()

No 5922, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A search-theoretic general equilibrium model of frictional unemployment is shown to be consistent with some of the key regularities of unemployment over the business cycle. In the model the return to a job moves stochastically. Agents can choose either to quit and search for a better job, or continue working. Search generates job offers that agents can accept or reject. Two distinguishing features of current work relative to the existing business cycle literature on labor market fluctuations are: (i) the decision to accept or reject jobs is modeled explicitly, and (ii) there is imperfect insurance against unemployment.

JEL-codes: D3 E24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-02
Note: EFG
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published as Gomes, Joao, Jeremy Greenwood and Sergio Rebelo. "Equilibrium Unemployment," Journal of Monetary Economics, 2001, v48(1,Aug), 109-152.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium unemployment (2001)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment (2001)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Unemployment (1997)
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