Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems

Aaron Edlin () and Benjamin Hermalin

No 6086, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent's investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: Investment by the agent can increase his value for the asset, thus improving his bargaining position in renegotiation. We show that option contracts will achieve the first best whenever this threat-point effect dominates the holdup effect. Otherwise, achieving the first best is difficult and, in many cases, impossible. In such cases, we show that if parties have an appropriate signal available, then the first best is still attainable for a wide class of bargaining procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so refuse to enforce.

JEL-codes: C78 D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-07
Note: LE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Edlin, Aaron S. and Benjamin E. Hermalin. "Contract Renegotiation And Options In Agency Problems," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2000, v16(2,Oct), 395-423.

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Working Paper: Contract Renegotiation in Agency Problems (1997)
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