Subsidiarity and the European Union

Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

No 6556, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The European Union is at a crossroads. At issue will be each of the three decisions which define a federal constitution: the number of participating governments, the assignment of policy responsibilities to the new EMU, and the representation of local interests in, and the decision-making rules for, the Union. Subsidiarity is to be the guiding principle. This essay reviews three alternative models of subsidiarity -- decentralized federalism, centralized federalism, and democratic federalism -- and argues the current European Economic Community has evolved from decentralized to centralized to a fully democratic federalist state. The structure of EMU governance is in place and it closely resembles that of the United States: an institutionally weak executive, a country-specific Council of Ministers and a locally representative Parliament. The remaining issues to be decided are the number of participating members and the assignment of policy responsibilities to levels of government. A large Union with significant fiscal policy responsibilities is likely to replicate U.S. economic policy performance.

JEL-codes: H1 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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