Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews

Eli Berman

No 6715, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The Israeli Ultra-Orthodox population doubles each seventeen years. With 60 % of prime aged males attending Yeshiva rather than working, that community is rapidly outgrowing its resources. Why do fathers with families in poverty choose Yeshiva over work? Draft deferments subsidize Yeshiva attendance, yet attendance typically continues long after they are draft exempt. We explain this puzzle with a club good model in which Yeshiva attendance signals commitment to the community. Subsidizing membership in a club with sacrifice as an entry requirement induces increased sacrifice, compounding the distortion and dissipating the subsidy. Policies treating members and potential entrants equally are Pareto improving. The analysis may generalize to other by increasing the stringency of prohibitions and sacrifice.

JEL-codes: D6 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: LS
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 2000). 6715 revised 10/26/00

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Journal Article: Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews (2000)
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