Redistributive Public Employment

Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly

No 6746, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Politicians may use disguised' redistributive policies in order to circumvent opposition to explicit tax-transfer schemes. First, we present a theoretical model that formalizes this hypothesis; then we provide evidence that in US cities, politicians use public employment as such a redistributive device. We find that city employment is significantly higher in cities where income inequality and ethnic fragmentation are higher.

Date: 1998-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pbe
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Published as Alesina, Alberto, Reza Baqir and William Easterly. "Redistributive Public Employment," Journal of Urban Economics, 2000, v48(2,Sep), 219-241.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6746.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Redistributive Public Employment (2000)
Working Paper: Redistributive Public Employment (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:6746

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6746

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().