Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights

Steven Shavell () and Tanguy van Ypersele

No 6956, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper compares reward systems to intellectual property rights (patents and copyrights). Under a reward system, innovators are paid for innovations directly by government (possibly on the basis of sales), and innovations pass immediately into the public domain. Thus, reward systems engender incentives to innovate without creating the monopoly power of intellectual property rights, but a principal difficulty with rewards is the information required for their determination. We conclude in our model that intellectual property rights do not possess a fundamental social advantage over reward systems, and that an optional reward system under which innovators choose between rewards and intellectual property rights is superior to intellectual property rights.

JEL-codes: D23 K11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-tid
Note: LE PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published as Shavell, Steven and Tanguy Van Ypersele. "Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 525-547.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights (2001)
Working Paper: Rewards versus intellectual property rights (2001)
Working Paper: Rewards versus intellectual property rights (1999)
Working Paper: Rewards versus intellectual property rights (1999)
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