Incentives to Settle Under Joint and Several Liability

Howard F. Chang and Hilary Sigman

No 7096, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Congress may soon restrict joint and several liability for cleanup of contaminated sites under Superfund. We explore whether this change would discourage settlements and is therefore likely to increase the program's already high litigation costs. Recent theoretical research by Kornhauser and Revesz finds that joint and several liability may either encourage or discourage settlement, depending upon the correlation of outcomes at trial across defendants. We extend their two-defendant model to a richer framework with N defendants. This extension allows us to test the theoretical model empirically using data on Superfund litigation. We find that joint and several liability does not discourage settlements and may even encourage them. Our results support the model's predictions about the effects of several variables, such as the degree of correlation in trial outcomes.

JEL-codes: K41 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-law
Note: PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, no. 1 (January 2000): 205-236.

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