Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information

Lucian Bebchuk () and Steven Shavell ()

No 7106, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high valuation buyers to reveal their valuation of performance, and we identified the circumstances under which such limitations on liability are and are not socially desirable. In an article forthcoming in the Stanford Law Review, Barry Adler develops a critique of our analysis, as well as that of Ayres and Gertner, who independently argued that contractual rules can beneficially facilitate information transfers. We reconsider here the subject of contractual liability and the revelation of information and respond to Adler's critique. We find Adler's model to be a natural extension of ours rather than a departure from it. Our reexamination leads to the conclusion that the informational effects that our work analyzed are important to take into account in designing contract rules.

Date: 1999-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind, nep-law and nep-mic
Note: LE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as "Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information" Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 6, pp. 1615-1627 (1999).

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7106.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7106

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7106

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().