Tradable Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation of the Stability Pacin the European Monetary Union

Alessandra Casella

No 7278, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Borrowing from the experience of environmental markets, this paper proposes a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the European Monetary Union: having chosen an aggregate target for the Union and an initial distribution of permits, EMU countries could be allowed to trade rights to deficit creation. The scheme exploits countries' incentives to minimize their costs, is transparent, flexible in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks and allows for adjustments in case of Europe-wide recessions. In addition, it need not treat all countries identically and can be designed to penalize countries with higher debt to GDP ratios. Finally, the scheme rewards countries for reducing their deficit below the initial allowance, lending credibility to the Stability Pact's goal of a balanced budget in the medium run.

Date: 1999-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-eec and nep-pub
Note: IFM ITI
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Published as Economic Policy, Vol. 29 (October 1999): 323-361.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7278.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tradable deficit permits: efficient implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7278

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7278

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().